19 research outputs found
The Color and Content of Their Fears: A Short Analysis of Racial Profiling
In response to Zackās āWhite Privilegeā and Black Rightsā, I consider her account of the hunting schema in light of police violence against black women. I argue that although Zack provides us with a compelling account of racial profiling and police brutality, the emotional aspect she attributes to the hunting schema is too charitable. I then claim that Zackās hunting schema fails to account for state violence against black women and in doing so she only tells a partial story of comparative injustice as it relates to police brutality of blacks
State Racism, State Violence, and Vulnerable Solidarity
What makes #BlackLivesMatter unique is the implication that it isnāt only some black lives that matter, that is, not only the most commonly referenced male lives. Rather, the hashtag suggests that all black lives matter, including queer, trans, disabled, and female. This movement includes all those black lives who have been marginalized within the black liberation tradition, as well as in greater society. The movement highlights the ways in which black people have been traditionally deprived of dignity and human rights. State racism and state violence are sustained together. The law creates a āsubraceā out of those whom white society fears and holds in contempt. This leaves not only black Americans but all citizens vulnerable. A way to fight this form of racism is not only to create a solidarity among the oppressed members of the subrace but to create a solidarity with all members, in āvulnerable solidarity.
Who's Messing With Your Mind?
In this chapter, mixed with moral psychology and ethics, I explore the topic of manipulation by analyzing āOrange Is The New Blackā season two antagonist, Yvonne āVeeā Parker. I claim that Vee is a master manipulator. I begin by laying out several definitions and features of manipulation. Definitions include covert influence, non-rational influence, the effect of non-rational influence, and intentionally making someone or altering a situation to make someone succumb to weaknesses. Features include trust, deception, emotion, false belief, and vulnerability. I argue that although philosophers (Anne Barnhill, Robert Noggle, and Colin McGinn) are divided on what manipulation is because not all definitions and features fit all cases, I claim that Veeās actions fit them all. I then attempt to explore what is bad and possibly good about manipulation. I examine if excellence alone is what makes manipulation good or should we take into consideration the autonomy denied the listener, the vices employed, and the bad consequences that arise from manipulation. I conclude with offering up suggestions on how one can guard themselves against manipulators
The Errors and Limitations of Our āAnger-Evaluatingā Ways
In this chapter I give an account of how our judgments of anger often play out in certain political instances. While contemporary philosophers of emotion have provided us with check box guides like āfittingnessā and āsizeā for evaluating anger, I will argue that these guides do not by themselves help us escape the tendency to mark or unmark the boxes selectively, inconsistently, and erroneously. If angerāparticularly anger in a political contextācan provide information and spark positive change or political destruction, then we have moral reasons to evaluate it properly. But can we? And what are the limitations and errors we often face when evaluating anger?
I will begin by laying out the ways in which we evaluate emotions and the moral and epistemic errors we attribute to the angry agent in judgments of disapproval. Then I attempt to answer the question: How do we judge political anger improperly? An improper evaluation, in my view, does not take into account relevant information that is needed to evaluate the anger. An overly generous, uninformed, biased, or selfish process of evaluation produces an improper evaluation. We see this occur when we immediately evaluate anger. I will also identify two social discursive practices of improper evaluation as well as the moral and epistemic errors committed when anger evaluators participate in these practices
Forgiveness, Exemplars, and the Oppressed
I argue that while moral exemplars are useful, we must be careful in our use of them. I first describe forgiveness exemplars that are often used to persuade victims to forgive such as Nelson Mandela, Martin Luther King Jr., and Jesus of Nazareth. I also explain how, for Kant, highlighting these figures as moral exemplars can be useful. I then explain two kinds of rhetorical strategies that are used when attempting to convince victims to forgive. Last, I explain (a la Kant) how the use of exemplars does not empower but instead disempowers victims. My overall claim is that using exemplars to persuade victims to forgive is problematic. It is best if we rely on decisive reasons to forgive instead of focusing on people who have forgiven
Coming out of the Shade
I claim that professional philosophers need to seriously rethink how they do philosophy, where they do philosophy, and with whom they do philosophy. My suggestion is that they āleave the shadeā of their philosophical bubbles by making their work accessible to each other and to the public and by engaging with thinkers outside of philosophy. I argue that if philosophers do not āleave the shade,ā we may witness the decline and even the eradication of the field of philosophy, as we know it
Love, Anger, and Racial Injustice
Luminaries like Martin Luther King, Jr. urge that Black Americans love even those who hate them. This can look like a rejection of anger at racial injustice. We see this rejection, too, in the growing trend of characterizing social justice movements as radical hate groups, and people who get angry at injustice as bitter and unloving. Philosophers like Martha Nussbaum argue that anger is backward-looking, status focused, and retributive. Citing the life of the Prodigal Son, the victims of the Charleston Church shooting, Gandhi, and King, she claims that we should choose love instead of anger ā not only in our intimate relationships but also in the political realm. Buddhist monk and scholar, ÅÄntideva, argued that anger is an obstacle to love. Anger leads to suffering. Love frees us from suffering. All this makes an initially compelling case against anger at racial injustice. In addition, although philosophers Jeffrie Murphy and Antti Kauppinen argue that anger communicates self-respect and valuing, respectivelyāāthey make no connection between agape love and anger. In this essay Iāll show that the love King and others have in mindāāagape loveāāis not only compatible with anger at hateful racists and complicit others, but finds valuable expression in such anger
Solidarity Care: How to Take Care of Each Other in Times of Struggle
Being aware of social injustices can cause existential and mental pain; comes with a burden; and may impede a flourishing
life. However, I shall argue that this is not a reason to despair or to choose to be willfully ignorant. Rather, itās a reason to
conclude that being conscious is not enough. Rather, during times of oppression, resisters must also prioritize well-being.
One way to do this is by extending what I refer to as solidarity care. I begin by providing an account of solidarity care. I then
offer pragmatic ways in which one can extend solidarity care to others. I conclude by responding to two possible worrie
Value-Based Protest Slogans: An Argument for Reorientation
When bringing philosophical attention to bear on social movement slogans in general, philosophers have often focused on their communicative natureāparticularly the hermeneutical failures that arise in discourse. Some of the most popular of these failures are illustrated in āall lives matterā retorts to āblack lives matterā pronouncements. Although highlighting and criticizing these failures provides much needed insight into social movement slogans as a communicative practice, I claim that in doing so, philosophers and slogansā users risk placing too much importance on outgroup understandings. This emphasis is misguided because gaining such uptake is not required of particular slogans to perform their functions; indeed it is an inherent risk of them. I show how such an emphasis can also be distracting to users. Since social movement slogans that express values are first and foremost for users, I argue for a shift in focus in what these slogans (such as āBlack Is Beautifulā and the more recent āBlack Lives Matterā) do for users, as well as what they demand from users and enable them to express. When slogans have done these things, regardless of uptake, we can say they have performed one of their key functions